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OWNER'S LIABILITY FOR HARM DONE BY THIEF
OPERATING STOLEN VEHICLE
Defendant, in violation of an Illinois statute,' parked his
car and left it unattended without locking the ignition and
removing the key. The car was taken by a thief who, shortly
after the theft, negligently collided with plaintiff's parked
car, damaging it. In a suit brought to recover damages, the
trial court gave judgment for plaintiff. On appeal, the Elli-
nois Appellate Court affirmed. Defendant's violation of the
statute was negligence. The conduct of the thief was not an
intervening efficient cause, exculpating defendant, since the
statute was designed to prevent the very type of harm which
occurred-injury to the public from negligent operation of
the vehicle by unauthorized persons. Ostergard v. Frisch, 77
N.E.2d 537 (Ill. App. 1948).
The instant case illustrates the harsh results which may
be attendant upon a mechanical application of the statutory
violation-negligence per se doctrine in areas where the culp-
able conduct is vastly disproportionate to the harm resulting.
The general class to which it belongs includes all cases in-
volving the liability of owners and operators of unattended
motor vehicles for damage resulting when the vehicle is set in
motion, most of which have reached logically sound and just
results by reference to existing doctrines of the common law,
without adverting to statutory standards.
The reported cases can be classified into three main
groups, according to the type of force which causes the ve-
hicle to leave its state of rest: (1) gravity or fortuitous
events, there being no intervening human act, (2) the inter-
vening act of irresponsible human agencies, e.g., meddling by
small children, or (3) the intervening act of a responsible
human agency. Further subdivision of the third group is
necessary, since the result reached will vary according to
whether the conduct of the intervening party is criminal,
negligent, or nonculpable.
Two questions must be decided in the affirmative to
establish liability on the part of the owner or operator. It
must first appear that he has been guilty of some negligent
1. Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd 1947) c.95Y2, 4189 (a). The text of
the section is set out in full, infra n.15.
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act. Certainly he is not an insurer of public safety, though
it has been said that the result in the instant case would go
far toward making him that.2 In the determination of the
question of negligence, whether or not the defendant has been
guilty of a statutory violation must be considered. Further,
it must be established that the negligence, if it be determined,
is a legal or "proximate" cause of the harm. Strangely,
statutes have also influenced the determination of questions
of causation.3
In the first two classes named-accidental starting and
meddling by irresponsible persons-little difference is per-
ceived between the cases decided with reference to statutory
standards and those decided on a pure common law basis. This
is to be expected; in these two areas, it is fairly easy to see
that the resultant harm is precisely the type of harm which
the legislature intended to prevent by the imposition of its
explicit standards of conduct. Courts had already declared
the forbidden conduct unreasonable in many cases, in the
first two areas. It should be borne in mind that, whether
or not a statute is involved, the problems faced are identical:
negligence and proximate cause must be established, and the
statute is simply an aid in the determination of these issues.
In the first class, where the vehicle has been set in motion
without human intervention, the operator has been held re-
sponsible for damage caused to third persons by the runaway
car, even where no statute or ordinance was involved.4 Thus,
liability has ensued where an automobile, negligently parked
on an incline, was set in motion by gravity5 or a slight jar,6
as well as where an automobile left with the motor running
inexplicably started upgrade.7  The doctrine of res ipsa lo-
quitur has been applied in these cases.8
2. Sullivan v. Griffin, 318 Mass. 359, 362, 61 N.E.2d 330, 332 (1945).
3. On the doctrine of negligence per se, see generally Prosser, "Hand-
book of the Law of Torts" §39 (1941); Harper, "A Treatise on
the Law of Torts" §78 (1933); Lowndes, "Civil Liability Created
by Criminal Legislation," 16 Minn. L. Rev. 361 (1932), criticizing
Thayer, "Public Wrongs and Private Actions," 27 Harv. L. Rev.
317 (1914).
4. See Note, 66 A.L.R. 439 (1930).
5. Henderson v. Homer, 287 Pa. 298, 135 AtI. 203 (1926).
6. Don v. Ivins Sons, 90 Pa. Super. 105 (1926).
7. Helfrich v. Gumari, 78 Pa. Super. 449 (1922).
8. Biller v. Meyer, 33 F.2d 440 (C.C.A. 7th 1929); Glaser v.
Schroeder, 269 Mass. 337, 168 N.E. 809 (1929). On the general
application of res ipsa loquitur where an unattended automobile
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Where the vehicle is set in motion by irresponsible per-
sons, chiefly children intermeddling, negligence and proximate
cause are generally treated as matters for jury determination,
absent any statute such as the one in the instant case.9 The
cases which have treated these problems as questions of law
in the absence of legislative pronouncement do so only to the
end of exculpating the defendant owner or operator.10 No
case has been found which, without statutory guidance, im-
poses liability as a matter of law by settling the elemental
questions of negligence and proximate cause as purely legal
inquiries. Such a result has been reached, however, under
the Illinois statute concerned in the principal case, and seems
sound.1 Nevertheless, the problem is less difficult in this
class of cases (and in the first class) than in those where a
responsible person, bent upon mischief or crime, intervenes.
Here, the operative effect of defendant's negligence is more
easily perceived. Where there is no intent on the part of the
intermeddling stranger to set the automobile in motion, the
negligent failure of the defendant to make it secure is much
more likely to be a sine qua non of the car's leaving its state
of rest.
The instant case belongs to the third class, where the
intervening criminal conduct of a responsible stranger sets
the car in motion.12 In this area, no case has been found
which has held, in the absence of statute, that liability ensues.
To do so would be to say that criminal conduct of a third
party is a foreseeable risk which must be guarded against at
starts from an unknown cause, see Note, 5 A.L.R. 1240, 1244
(1920), supplemented in 64 A.L.R. 255, 260 (1929) and 93 A.L.R.
1101, 1116 (1934). Where injury to a child results therefrom,
see Note, 140 A.L.R. 539 (1942).
9. Bergman v. Williams, 173 Minn. 250, 217 N.W. 127 (1927); Tier-
ney v. N.Y. Dugan Bros., 288 N.Y. 16, 41 N.E.2d 161 (1942);
Bronk v. Davenny, 25 Wash.2d 443, 171 P.2d 237 (1946). The
doctrine of attractive nuisance was applied in the first two cases.
10. Walter v. Bond, 267 App. Div. 779, 45 N.Y.Supp. 378 (1943) (in-
toxicated taxi-passenger started taxi); Mann v. Parshali, 229
App. Div. 366, 241 N.Y.Supp. 673 (1930) (unknown person
started and abandoned car).
11. Moran v. Borden Co., 309 Ill. App. 391, 33 N.E.2d 166 (1941).
12. On intervening criminal acts of third parties, see generally Harper,
"A Treatise on the Law of Torts" §124 (1933); Prosser, "Hand-
book of the Law of Torts" §49 (1941); Feezer and Favour, "Inter-
vening Crime and Liability for Negligence," 24 Minn. L. Rev. 635
(1940); Harper and Kime, "The Duty to Control the Conduct of
Another," 43 Yale L. J. 886 (1934); Eldredge, "Culpable Interven-
tion as Superseding Cause," 86 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 121 (1937).
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the operator's peril. Without legislative encouragement,
courts have not ordinarily reached this result except where
the surrounding circumstances clearly point to a high prob-
ability of intervening crime. 3 On the contrary, however, it
has been held as a matter of law that criminal conduct of a
third party is an intervening efficient cause, relieving the
defendant of liability."4
All but fourteen states have enacted some sort of pro-
vision regulating motor vehicles parked and left unattended, 5
but of the thirty-four states having such provisions, only
twelve have any relation to the problems raised by intervening
crime. Those adopting the exact provision of the Uniform
Act are obviously concerned only with accidental starting, or,
more dubiously, innocent intermeddling. Among the juris-
dictions having statutes which can be brought to bear in
cases falling in the same category as the instant case, dia-
metrically opposite results have been reached.
13. Brauer v. N.Y. Central & H.R.R.R., 91 N.J.L. 190, 103 Atl. 166
(1918); Hines v. Garrett, 131 Va. 125, 108 S.E. 690 (1921).
14. Castay v. Katz & Besthoff, 148 So. 76 (La. App. 1933). The same
jurisdiction has imposed liability on the owner where the inter-
vening conduct of the third person was not criminal. Maggiore
v. Laundry & Dry Cleaning Service, 150 So. 394 (La. App. 1933).
In that case, defendant negligently parked his electric truck
across a drive. Due to faulty mechanism, the truck started in
motion when two persons, without negligence, attempted to shove
it forward a few feet to clear the drive. Defendant was held
liable for damage done a third person by the truck.
15. The basic source of provisions regulating the safeguarding of
parked motor vehicles left unattended is found in §52 of the Uni-
form Act Regulating Traffic on Highways, which reads: "§52.
Motor Vehicle Left Unattended, Brakes to Be Set and Engine
Stopped. No person having control or charge of a' motor vehicle
shall allow such vehicle to stand on any highway unattended
without first effectively setting the brakes thereon and stopping
the motor of said vehicle, and when standing upon any perceptible
grade without turning the front wheels of such vehicle to the
curb or side of the highway."
This section is contained in the following statutory provisions:
Ala. Code (1940) tit.36 §27; Ariz. Code (1939) §66-118; Cal. Veh.
Code (Deering 1943) §595; Del. Rev. Code (1935) §5643; Idaho
Code (1932) §48-526; Iowa Code (Reichman 1939) §321.362; La.
Gen. Stat. (Dart 1939) §5220 (e); Mich. Comp. Laws (1929)
94720; Minn. Stat. (Henderson 1941) §169.36; Neb. Rev. Stat.
(1943) §39-759; N.J. Rev. Stat. (1937) §39:4-137; N.M. Stat. Ann.
(1941) §68-525; N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law §86-3, 4; N.C. Gen. Stat.
(Michie et al., 1943) §20-163; N.D. Rev. Code (1943) §39-1024;
Ore. Comp. Laws Ann. (1940) §115-355; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon
1939) tit.75 §613; S.D. Code (1939) §44.0326; Tenn. Ann. Code
(Williams 1934) §2691; Tex. Laws 1947, c.421 §97; Va. Code
(Michie et al., 1942) §2154(146) (c); Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann.
(Remington Repl. Vol. 7A, 1937) §6360-109. (Twenty-two states.)
The Illinois statute involved in the instant case is 'a common
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The Massachusetts court, in a case indistinguishable from
the Ostergard case, and with a similar statute6 under con-
sideration, denied recovery. 7 It was held that though the
defendant's violation of the statute was prima facie evidence
of negligence, the causal relation was too remote. Though it
was found that the legislative intent had been directed in
part toward the prevention of theft, it did not necessarily
follow that this included all the possible consequences of a
theft which actually occurred. 8
In direct conflict with the Massachusetts cases is the
doctrine laid down in Ross v. Hartman,"9 the leading case in
the District of Columbia. In that case, Judge Edgerton,
speaking for the Court of Appeals, held that violation of the
pertinent traffic regulation" was negligence per se. Further,
variation of the provision in the Uniform Act. It reads: "No
person driving or ,in charge of a motor vehicle shall permit it to
stand unattended without first stopping the engine, locking the
ignition and removing the key, or when standing upon any per-
ceptible grade without effectively setting the brake thereon and
turning the front wheels to the curb or side of the highway."
Eight states have enacted the provision in this form: Ark.
Dig. Stat. (Pope 1937) §6951; Colo. Stat. Ann. (Michie et al.,
1935) c.16 §232; Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd 1947) c.95 , §189;
Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns Repl. 1940) §47-2124; Ky. Rev. Stat.
(1946) §189.430(3); Miss. Code Ann. (1942) §8219; Utah Code
Ann. (1943) §57-7-169; Wyo. Comp. Stat. Ann. (1945) §60-530.
Four additional states have statutory provisions regarding
the safeguarding of unattended automobiles, but do not follow
either of the above common forms: Md. Ann. Code Gen. Laws
Flack 1939) Art. 56 §200; Mass. Ann. Laws (1933) c.90 §13
set out infra n.16); Mo. Rev. Stat. (1939) §8401(k); Vt. Pub.
Laws (1933) §§5127, 5128.
The traffic regulation of the District of Columbia is set out
infra n.20.
No general statutory provisions were found in the remaining
fourteen states. However, in many instances local ordinances
will raise the question of negligence per se in this field.
16. Mass. Ann. Laws (1933) c.90 §13. " . . .No person having con-
trol or charge of a motor vehicle shall allow such vehicle to stand
in any way and remain unattended without first locking or mak-
ing it fast or effectively setting the brakes thereon, and stopping
the motor of said vehicle."
17. Sullivan v. Griffin, 318 Mass. 359, 61 N.E.2d 330 (1945); Slater
v. T. C. Baker Co., 261 Mass. 424, 158 N.E. 778 (1927).
18. Sullivan v. Griffin, 318 Mass. 359, 361, 61 N.E.2d 330, 332 (1945).
19. 78 App. D.C. 217, 139 F.2d 14 (1943). The case is approved in
Note, 32 Geo. L. Rev. 202 (1944) where the author suggests that it
be restricted to its facts, because of the extension of liability in-
volved. The result was followed in Bullock v. Dahlstrom, 46 A.2d
370 (Muni. Ct. of App. for D.C. 1946), as well as in the Illinois
case here noted.
20. Traffid and Motor Vehicle Regulations for the District of Colum-
bia, §58. "Locks on Motor Vehicles. Every motor vehicle shall
be equipped with a lock suitable to lock the starting lever, throttle,
498
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since theft was a consequence to be prevented, and reckless
driving by an escaping thief was a foreseeable consequence
of the theft, it would follow that the legislature intended to
include, within the class of harms to be prevented, damage
done to third persons as a result of the thief's operation of
the vehicle. Thus the questions of both negligence and causa-
tion were settled by reference to a legislative pronouncement.
The difficulty with the position taken in the Ross case is
that the legislative intent to prevent the type of harm which
occurred is far from apparent. It can be discerned only by
the most astute examination of the particular section involved
in context.21 This, it has been said, makes the intent appar-
ent,22 though it cannot be denied that reasonable men might
differ with this conclusion. Certainly, the opposite conclusion
would be reached by examination of the Illinois provision con-
cerned in the Ostergard case. The section construed is a part
of an act "regulating traffic on highways" and is a variation
of the provision of the Uniform Act which requires stopping
the engine, setting the brakes, and turning the wheels to the
curb-measures which are clearly directed only toward acci-
dent or intermeddling, and which would deter a thief not at
all.23 None of the adjacent or nearby sections contain pro-
visions which might be construed as having been designed
for the prevention of theft and harms resulting therefrom. 24
If an implied legislative intent is to be found, no aid is forth-
coming from resort to the remainder of the act. And it is
clear that an intent to prevent the class of harm involved in
the instant case would be most difficult to find on the face
of the section.25 Yet, in spite of the impossibility of spinning
out the legislative intent from "the four corners of the act,"
neither line of authority has buttressed its conclusions with
the legislative history of the section involved. The legislative
or switch, or gearshift lever, by which the vehicle is set in motion,
and no person shall allow any motor vehicle operated by him to
stand or remain unattended on any street or in any public place
without first having locked the lever, throttle, or switch by which
said motor vehicle may be set in motion."
21. Ibid.
22. Note, 32 Geo. L. Rev. 202 (1944).
23. The pertinent section, §52 of the Uniform Act Regulating Traffic
on Highways, is set out in full, supra n.15.
24. Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on Highways, Ill. Ann. Stat.
(Smith-Hurd 1947) c.95V. As adopted by Illinois, many pro-
visions of the Uniform Act were greatly changed.
25. Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd 1947) c.95% §189(a).
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intent "found" by the courts appears to be little more than a
guess.
Perhaps it is more than that. Perhaps the court is de-
lineating what its own intent would have been, had it partici-
pated in the passage of the act-outlining the class of harms
which it would have desired to eliminate through operation of
the new law. How does this process fit with the standard
rationalization of negligence per se-that the legislature
rather than the court defines, for the particular field, what
shall constitute reasonable conduct?20
That rationale works perfectly well where the legislative
intent is express, necessarily implied, or capable of proof by
committee reports, speeches from the floor, and other con-
temporary legislative expressions. Yet such materials are
seldom available to throw light on the enactments of state
legislatures. And where the intent is vague and inarticulate,
a court must interpret the statute in the light of its own best
judgment in order to capture the elusive legislative motiva-
tion. It has been said that they are not only permitted to do
so; they cannot avoid doing so.27 The legislature has paternal-
ly foreseen for the parties some dangerous results of the pro-
scribed conduct, but has coyly refrained from specifying what
parties it aims to protect, as well as what dangers it is guard-
ing against. Thus: The legislature has defined reasonable
conduct under the circumstances, but the court must in turn
interpret the legislative definition before it can discover pre-
cisely what conduct is unreasonable in a given circumstance.
If legislatively established criteria are missing, the court must
substitute its own judicial definition. But in the absence of
legislative direction, courts have themselves the power to
define reasonable conduct. It is this power which should be
exercised where the legislative fiat is so tenuous and insub-
stantial as to afford no practical guidance to the court. There
is no difference in this situation and that in which the legis-
lature has spoken not at all. It is idle to require that the
judicial definition of reasonableness be distorted into the
pattern of a statute which touches the problem only tangen-
tially. Especially is this true where the only basis for the
26. Harper, "A Treatise on the Law of Torts" §78 (1933).




conclusion that the statute was intended to apply at all is a
strained and doubtful reasoning, bare of corroborative facts.
Neither negligence per se nor any extension of existing
doctrines of proximate cause should be determined in reliance
upon an imperfectly-expressed, or perhaps wholly non-exis-
tent, legislative intent. Legally sound results have been
reached in many jurisdictions without reference to any
statute .2  Negligence in these cases is not ordinarily so
difficult of proof that an injured plaintiff requires assistance
from the doctrine of negligence per se. Where proof is diffi-
cult, res ipsa loquitur springs to his aid.29 As to the matter
of causation, even the instant case concedes that statutory
extensions of proximate cause are recognized only where the
statute "by its obvious intent" demands it.30 As has been
demonstrated, the intent behind the Illinois statute is far from
obvious, and the prevalence of dissenting opinions in this
class of cases gives testimony that this is everywhere true.
Absent such obvious legislative intent, existing common-law
doctrines should prevail. Unique facts do not make for uni-
versal solution, and each case of the entire class is better
settled by reference to common-law principles of negligence
and causation, viewed in relation to all the circumstances, than
by an arbitrary attempt to lay down mechanical rules of law
as to both.
28. See cases cited supra n.4 through n.10.
29. Glaser v. Schroeder, 269 Mass. 337, 168 N.E. 809 (1929). See
also annotations collected, supra n.8.
30. The instant case affords an instance of statutory extension of
the concept of proximate cause. " ... a statute may by its obvious
intent enlarge upon the general definition of proximate cause."
77 N.E.2d 537, 541 (Ill. App. 1948).
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